1. The Structure of Central Government
Central government in the United Kingdom is built around Parliament, situated at the historic Palace of Westminster. Parliament is not a single body but a composite institution — the Crown-in-Parliament — consisting of three main components, each with a distinct constitutional function.
The English Parliament is situated at the historic Palace of Westminster and consists of three main components: the Monarch, the House of Commons and the House of Lords. Each plays a separate role in the making of law and in the wider system of government.
2.1.1 The Monarch
2.1.2 The House of Commons
2.1.3 The House of Lords
| Component | Description | Key power / function |
|---|---|---|
| Monarch | The reigning King or Queen; largely ceremonial role. | Gives Royal Assent to legislation. |
| House of Commons | The 'lower house'; members are elected MPs. | Propose and vote on legislation. |
| House of Lords | The 'upper house'; life peers and bishops (hereditary peers removed by the House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Act 2026). | Acts as a revising chamber for legislation. |
2. Mechanisms of Accountability
Accountability is central to constitutional government. It explains how those who exercise public power can be required to answer for the way in which they exercise it. This section sets out the meaning of accountability, its purposes, and the methods by which it is secured through the separation of powers.
2.2 The Purposes of Accountability
Accountability serves a number of overlapping purposes. The following six purposes explain why mechanisms of accountability exist and what they are designed to achieve.
Legitimacy — to reinforce the legitimacy of the Government.
Transparency — to discover information on government performance and to ensure the availability of an explanation for government actions.
Control — to provide a means to control the Government and ensure it acts in conformity with public expectations.
Restoration — to ensure that government wrongs are made right.
Punishment — to punish egregious abuse of power.
Deterrence — to facilitate improvements in government performance and to disincentivise poor conduct.
2.2.1 Methods (Separation of Powers)
The methods by which government is held to account can be grouped according to the three organs of state under the separation of powers: the legislature, the executive and the judiciary.
(1) Legislature
(2) Executive
(3) Judiciary
| Organ of state | Mechanisms | Nature |
|---|---|---|
| Legislature | Parliamentary Committees; Representative Government; Responsible Government | Scrutiny by, and accountability to, Parliament and the electorate |
| Executive | Commissions; Comptroller and Auditor General; Ombudsmen; Freedom of Information; Tribunals | Oversight, audit, complaints-handling and disclosure within the administration |
| Judiciary | Tort Law; Criminal Law; Judicial Review | Legal accountability before the courts |
2.2.2 Special Mechanisms
2.2.2.1 Contempt of Parliament
Contempt of Parliament is conduct that obstructs or impedes either House in the performance of its functions, or that obstructs a Member or officer of the House. It can be committed by Members of Parliament (MPs) or by others (for example a witness who gives misleading evidence to a committee). Each House has the power to punish contempts; sanctions against a Member can range from a formal reprimand to suspension or, exceptionally, expulsion from the House. This power helps to ensure that those dealing with Parliament maintain a high standard of integrity and honesty.
2.2.2.2 Parliamentary Committees
Parliamentary committees may be classified by their type, and each is given specific functions by Parliament.
Functions — Committees are given specific tasks by Parliament, such as scrutinising legislation, conducting inquiries, and making recommendations. A leading example is the House of Commons Justice Committee, a departmental select committee that examines the expenditure, administration and policy of the Ministry of Justice, including proposed legislation and policy initiatives in legal and constitutional matters.
| Aspect | Select Committees | Public Bill Committees |
|---|---|---|
| Permanence | Permanent — established under standing orders | Temporary — set up for a specific Bill |
| Lifespan | Continue from one Parliament to the next | Cease to exist once work on the Bill is completed |
| Role | Ongoing scrutiny of a department or subject | Committee-stage scrutiny of a single Bill |
2.2.3 Comptroller and Auditor General: Detailed Overview
The Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG), heading the National Audit Office (NAO), is an important instrument of financial accountability. The office is governed by the National Audit Act 1983 and the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011. Its work can be analysed in terms of its functions and its independence.
(i) Financial Audits — the C&AG audits the annual accounts of central government departments, agencies and many other public bodies, and reports the results to Parliament.
(ii) Value-for-Money (Performance) Audits — the C&AG has the authority to conduct value-for-money examinations, involving a comprehensive review of the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which a body has used its resources.
(i) Statutory Independence — the C&AG is an independent officer of the House of Commons, who has complete discretion in the discharge of their functions and is not subject to direction or control by the Government in relation to the conduct of audits.
(ii) Funding — the National Audit Office's budget is set by the Public Accounts Commission of Parliament, which provides a degree of parliamentary oversight while keeping the office independent of the Government it audits.
| Dimension | Detail |
|---|---|
| Financial Audits | Audits the annual accounts of central government and other public bodies. |
| Value-for-Money Audits | Comprehensive review of the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of a body's use of resources. |
| Statutory Independence | Independent officer of the House of Commons; complete discretion over functions; not subject to direction by the Government on the conduct of audits. |
| Funding | NAO budget set by the Public Accounts Commission of Parliament — parliamentary oversight, independent of the executive. |
① Accountability is an actor–forum relationship: the actor must explain and justify and may face consequences.
② Six purposes: legitimacy, transparency, control, restoration, punishment, deterrence.
③ Methods map onto the three organs of state (legislature / executive / judiciary).
④ Special mechanisms: contempt of Parliament (reprimand → expulsion); committees (select v public bill); the Comptroller and Auditor General (independent officer of the House of Commons, NAO budget set by Parliament).
3. Case Studies
The following case studies illustrate how accountability mechanisms — and in particular public audit — operate in practice in England and Wales. They concern public expenditure and the role of the National Audit Office (NAO) and the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) in scrutinising it.
2.3.1 COVID-19 Procurement and the 'High Priority Lane'
During the COVID-19 pandemic the Government awarded large contracts for personal protective equipment (PPE) at speed and without competition. The National Audit Office examined this expenditure and found that suppliers referred by ministers, MPs and officials were placed in a 'high priority lane' that was around ten times more likely to result in a contract, and that the Department of Health and Social Care had not adequately documented key decisions. The findings were taken up by the Public Accounts Committee, illustrating how financial audit feeds parliamentary scrutiny of executive spending.
2.3.2 Carillion and the Collapse of an Outsourcing Giant
The 2018 collapse of Carillion, a major Government contractor, prompted scrutiny of how public money is committed to outsourced services. The National Audit Office reported on the costs and risks to the taxpayer, and a joint inquiry by the Work and Pensions and the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy select committees examined the failure. The episode shows how audit findings and select committee inquiries combine to hold both the company and the contracting departments to account, and fuelled calls for greater transparency and accountability in public procurement.
4. Key Notes (Chapter Summary)
The following summary table consolidates the key items, concepts and references examined in this chapter. Treat it as a revision checklist — you should be able to explain each row from memory.
| Key Items | Concepts | Cases / References |
|---|---|---|
| Structure of Central Government | Monarch: ceremonial role, Royal Assent. House of Commons: elected, legislative power. House of Lords: revising chamber — life peers and bishops (hereditary peers removed in 2026). | Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949; House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Act 2026 |
| Mechanisms of Accountability | Purposes: legitimacy; transparency; control; restoration; punishment; deterrence. | Separation of powers; ministerial responsibility (Ministerial Code) |
| Methods (Separation of Powers) | Legislature: Parliamentary Committees, Representative Government, Responsible Government. Executive: Commissions, Comptroller and Auditor General, Ombudsmen, Freedom of Information, Tribunals. Judiciary: Tort Law, Criminal Law, Judicial Review. | UK Constitutional Law; Human Rights Act 1998; Freedom of Information Act 2000 |
| Special Mechanisms | Contempt of Parliament; types of parliamentary committees (Select, Public Bill). | Parliamentary privilege; Erskine May's Parliamentary Practice |
| Comptroller and Auditor General | Financial Audits; Value-for-Money Audits; Independence. | National Audit Act 1983; Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011 |
5. Task (Written Practice)
The SQE1 is assessed by single best answer questions, but a structured written task remains a valuable way to consolidate your understanding. Attempt the following task in your own words before reviewing the chapter.
6. MCQ Practice — SQE-Style Questions
The following questions mirror the style and difficulty of the SQE1 FLK1 single best answer questions. Attempt each question closed-book, write down your answer, then turn to the answer key, which explains why each option is correct or incorrect.
A. They can only make recommendations but cannot enforce them.
B. They have the power to prosecute government officials.
C. They can amend or veto legislation.
D. They are chaired by the Prime Minister.
E. They can directly allocate budgets to government departments.
Answer & explanation
A is correct — parliamentary committees, such as the Public Accounts Committee, have the authority to scrutinise government actions and make recommendations, but they do not have the power to enforce those recommendations. Their role is advisory and investigative.
B is incorrect — committees do not prosecute government officials; prosecution is a function of the criminal justice system.
C is incorrect — committees scrutinise and report on legislation but do not have a general power to amend or veto it.
D is incorrect — committees are not chaired by the Prime Minister.
E is incorrect — committees cannot directly allocate budgets; that is a function of government and Parliament through the supply process. (See Section 2.2.1.)
A. The independence of the Comptroller and Auditor General is absolute and not subject to any form of control.
B. Although the National Audit Office's budget is set by Parliament, the Comptroller and Auditor General remains an independent officer of the House of Commons, not subject to direction from anyone, including the Government, in the conduct of audits.
C. The Comptroller and Auditor General is entirely under the control of the Government because the National Audit Office's budget is set by Parliament.
D. The Comptroller and Auditor General is accountable only to the Prime Minister, which limits his or her independence.
E. The independence of the Comptroller and Auditor General depends entirely on his or her personal integrity and professional ethics.
Answer & explanation
B is correct — although the National Audit Office's budget is set by Parliament (through the Public Accounts Commission), this does not place the office under government control. By law, the Comptroller and Auditor General is an independent officer of the House of Commons, with complete discretion in the discharge of their functions and not subject to direction by anyone, including the Government, in relation to the conduct of audits.
A is incorrect — independence is not absolute; the funding arrangements provide a degree of parliamentary oversight, so it is inaccurate to say there is no form of control.
C is incorrect — the Comptroller and Auditor General is an independent officer of the House of Commons, not under the control of the Government.
D is incorrect — the Comptroller and Auditor General is not accountable to the Prime Minister or any other government minister; the office answers to Parliament.
E is incorrect — while personal integrity and ethics matter, the Comptroller and Auditor General's independence is legally defined by statute and does not rest solely on personal qualities. (See Section 2.2.3.)